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According to the Pew Research Center, 50% of Americans have bought a lottery 
ticket in their lifetime and 25% do so at least once a week, amounting to over $70 
billion spent on lotteries in 2014 alone. My dissertation traces the rise of state 
lotteries in the political, cultural, religious, and economic context of the late 
twentieth century. Unlike previous studies that assume a timeless popularity of 
gambling, I argue that lotteries illustrate how individuals as well as state 
governments responded to economic uncertainty. As the economy increasingly 
failed to provide middle- and working-class Americans with financial stability 
through traditional means, many turned to lotteries as alternative avenues of 
social advancement. With similar hopes for a financial windfall in an era of tax 
rebellion, government officials turned to lotteries in this period to address 
increasingly imbalanced state and municipal budgets. 
 
As I began researching American state lotteries, it became clear that New York 
would present a central case study for my dissertation. In 1966, New York 
became the second state to legalize a lottery and its lottery has been the highest 
selling in the United States for over two decades. Yet, rather than merely focus on 
the New York Lottery at the height of its success, I came to the Rockefeller 
Archive Center (RAC) hoping to learn about how New York’s lottery came into 
existence. While I examined hundreds of files in my time at the RAC, the crux of 
my research was spent investigating the letters ordinary New Yorkers wrote to 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller in the 1960s to express their views on the lottery. 
While previous studies have noted the role of tax and revenue considerations in 
driving support for state lotteries, none has yet examined the voices of individual 
voters who supported and opposed the legalization of gambling.1
 
 In this paper, I 
highlight some of the most prevalent arguments in support of and in opposition 
to a lottery in New York. Through the voices of ordinary citizens, my work reveals 
a fundamental parallel between taxpayers and gamblers: both viewed the lottery 
as a financial panacea. Through the words of these voters, I reveal the 
expectations of a lottery and the consequences of unfulfilled expectations.  
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Throughout the 1960s, lottery proponents both in and outside Albany expected a 
state lottery to provide a fiscal windfall for their state. Indeed, estimates among 
New York state senators at the time claimed that a New York lottery could earn as 
much as $400 million for the state per year.2 John Chathenberger of Kew 
Gardens wrote to Governor Rockefeller in 1965 that he had “read with disgust 
[that Rockefeller was] against a state lottery, even though it would bring in $240 
million a year. Why?” One anonymous Dominican immigrant agreed, claiming 
that they were in favor of a state lottery which they predicted “will far exceed 
expectations.”3 William Eaton of Buffalo concurred: “I believe the state lottery 
will turn out real good [sic] for the many needs of the state….”4
 
 
As illustrated by such hyperbolic estimates, New Yorkers had little conception of 
the limits of gambling as a means of raising state revenue. Nonetheless, buoyed 
by images of overflowing state coffers, taxpayers saw a state-run lottery as an 
alternative to taxes. Instead of income, sales, or property levies, state government 
functions could be paid for using gambling revenue. For example, Claude S. Antis 
Jr. of Johnston explained that a lottery  
 
is a God send to raise money for the needs of the poor people of New York 
State. … [M]ost of the people can not stand more taxes, so the only way to 
raise more money is to approve a state lottery … monies coming from the 
state lottery could help them in the purchase of needed school books, milk 
for the children that can't afford it and other needed school aids.5
 
 
Like Johnston, most New Yorkers who wrote to Rockefeller supported the 
maintenance of a powerful and robust state government. What they opposed was 
further taxation. One citizen  claimed that “the lottery will get the revenue you 
need to run the state” while another wrote that “if the people of New York State 
had a lottery once a month we could raise enough money so we would not have to 
tax the people so much.”6
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Some New Yorkers went so far as to imply that a lottery could eliminate taxes 
altogether. Particularly those struggling with their current tax burdens imagined 
the lottery as their fiscal savior. “I wish to respectfully ask you what you think we 
are going to live on if you keep raising taxes. You know we do not all have the 
income you have,” one angry Albany voter wrote to Rockefeller: “If you would 
legalize a lottery I am sure it would eliminate further taxation of the citizens.”7 
Morris Rassman of Brooklyn agreed: “I can appreciate your need to find sources 
of revenue to meet the rising costs of running the State government…. A lottery … 
would bring in enough money to meet all the needs of this state. It would be a 
better way of raising funds than new taxes all the time…”8 In 1965, Phyllis 
Keiagek of Buffalo explained to Rockefeller: “Instead of increased taxes, fees … 
how about a bi-weekly lottery or similar? … I’m sure there would be a lot of 
takers. You can’t imagine how tough it is scraping through from pay to pay. All 
this talk about increased taxes makes life seem that much more unbearable."9
 
 
The popular vision of a lottery as a viable alternative to taxes was built around 
specific ideas of where this new revenue would come from. Ruth Baer of Briarcliff 
Manor wrote in 1964 that, “Since NY State needs more revenue—why would we 
not have a state lottery like New Hampshire[?] It seems such a painless way to 
raise taxes.”10 Similarly, a group describing itself as the “American Reclamation 
Committee” sent Rockefeller a proposal for a state lottery, explaining: “This 
lottery is a very important step New York state is taking because lottery money, at 
best, represents unearned money…”11 The notion that lottery revenue was 
painless bore particular classed and racialized implication. When voters and 
officials imagined “painless” lottery revenue they meant painless to the—
implicitly white and suburban—taxpayer. Rather than extract tax dollars from the 
presumably non-gambling white suburbanite, proponents envisioned the lottery 
as a conduit by which the losses of poor or black gamblers could fill state coffers. 
Thus, advocates presented the lottery as creating a brand new source of state 
revenue, one capable of solving the state’s budget crisis without imposing on the 
taxpayer. 
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Lottery supporters utilized a number of arguments to justify their proposal that 
the state government should profit from gambling. Foremost was the belief that 
illegal lottery playing was already widespread. Rather than proliferate gambling, 
lottery supporters claimed, a state-run game would allow New York to garner 
revenue from something happening anyway, as poor New Yorkers already spent 
huge percentages of their income on gambling. The perception of a prevalent 
illegal wagering market was largely accurate. According to one 1964 anti-
gambling pamphlet, Americans spent approximately $5 billion per year on illegal 
lotteries.12 In New York City alone, players bet up to $600 million annually. 
Though the imagined numbers player was often black—largely due to the 
disproportionate policing of black numbers games—Matthew Vaz illustrates that 
white mobsters—with the help of corrupt urban police departments—had taken 
over the business between the 1940s and 1960s and had begun attracting more 
white working-class players.13
 
 
With their eye towards illegal players, lottery advocates assumed gambling 
among the poor to be inevitable. Through a state-run lottery, the poor could 
continue to gamble while regular, non-gambling taxpayers could gain tax relief 
with the revenue. “People will gamble, and the underworld is getting nearly all 
the proceeds at the present,” one New Yorker wrote. “This money helps to finance 
other illegal activities…”14 One New York City resident explained: “A $250 
[million lottery] is good for all—money for schools, we gamble anyway! It will not 
take money from the poor any more than they do now in bingo” and other forms 
of gambling.15 In addition to other forms of gambling in New York, voters saw the 
flock of gamblers to participate in the New Hampshire Lottery and sought to keep 
that money in their own state. G. Wallace Cane of Greenwood Lake explained that 
players want to be to free to do what they want and buy Sweepstakes tickets “in 
their own state instead of sending some abroad, for this would give them the 
thrill of possibly winning or at least contributing to the welfare of the State and 
securing a reduction in their taxes accordingly. … No matter whether the 
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Sweepstakes purchasers wins or loses, he gains thru [sic] reduction of taxes and 
naturally is for it, and the thrill that goes with it.”16
 
 
However, lottery opponents refused to imagine a state-run sweepstakes as a 
financial panacea. Like the lottery supporters, opponents did not coalesce into an 
organized movement, but individually raised their voices throughout the 1960s to 
express their unease with a legal lottery. The anti-lottery camp directly addressed 
many of the points raised by lottery proponents. For example, while lottery 
advocates claimed that legalization could wipe out organized crime, lottery 
opponents envisioned that the legalization of gambling would invite crime. One 
Rochester woman believed that her state was “big and strong enuf [sic] to handle 
education … without the gambling money” which she maintained would invite 
“graft and fraud.”17 Abraham Goldstein of New York City wrote in 1966 that he 
was “of the opinion that this [lottery] is opening a wedge to legalized gambling in 
this state with all its corrupt influences.”18
 
  
In addition to attention to crime, opponents relied on two arguments to oppose a 
state lottery. Both of their central claims sought to directly counter supporters’ 
assertions that a lottery could provide a new, painless source of vital revenue for 
the state. Opponents highlighted the overlooked costs of a lottery for both 
individual gamblers and the state. First, opponents underlined the regressive 
nature of lottery playing: the state would not be garnering income ex nihilo, but 
would attract revenue from its poorest citizens who would be further enticed to 
gamble if they could do so legally. For instance, one Little Neck resident wrote 
that he opposed the lottery because “the poor will be the ones who will support 
the middle class and upper class schools. … [A] poor working man will take the 
far-fetched gamble to try to better his lot. … this is wrong.”19 Norman Le Van 
concurred: “This method of raising funds is contrary to all Christian teachings … 
the lure of something for nothing will appeal to those who can not afford the loss 
with the odds so much against them. It cannot help but increase our welfare load, 
this class of person so tempted by the get rich appeal will spend every available 
R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  7 
 
cent they posses [sic].”20 One Great Neck woman wrote that she did not approve 
of her state’s lottery “because it wastes money … a man may decide to try his luck 
with a week’s salary.”21
 
 Like lottery supporters, opponents understood that the 
poor would serve as the state lottery’s most prominent patrons. However, rather 
than trumpet the possibilities of the Empire State earning revenue from 
gamblers’ losses, opponents cautioned against further harming the poor and 
undermining what they believed to be the traditional work ethic that celebrated 
hard work—rather than luck—as the only proper avenue to material success.  
In their second argument, lottery opponents drew direct parallels between the 
actions of players and the state itself: just as gamblers were misguided for trying 
to earn something for nothing, so too politicians should not attempt to solve 
budgetary problems with tokenistic lottery revenue. While supporters 
championed the lottery precisely on the grounds that it provided a major new 
source of state income, lottery opponents were among the few New Yorkers who 
recognized the limited returns the lottery would provide relative to the true scale 
of the state’s fiscal problems. The Riverview Parent Teachers’ Association, for 
instance, wrote to Rockefeller that they opposed the lottery because gambling 
represented an unsound and unpredictable means of education funding: “We 
believe, that taxes with broad bases, justly levied and equally distributed are 
sound guide lines for financing Education.”22 The Episcopal Bishop of Albany 
agreed: “It is a sad moment in the history of this State when its Legislature can 
find no better way to meet an understandable and growing budget for mass 
education. The proposal is unimaginative, undignified and unworthy of one of the 
wealthiest political jurisdictions in the Nation.”23
 
 
Other opponents, however, admitted that they did not support a state lottery 
despite its revenue potential. R. Paul Jones of New York City wrote in 1966:  
 
A lottery … would bring in large revenues, granted. But this form of 
lottery, like all lotteries or numbers gambling, appeals to that segment of 
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the population who can least afford the money spent. Their need for 
money—‘a lot of money’ induces them to spend 50c, or a dollar a day on 
the ‘numbers’, which is automatically a fifty percent loss to them over the 
long average, does not enrich the government, causes the need for a large 
investigation force to curb the racket, and enriches the racketeers in the 
state.  
 
Kenneth King of Boston, New York agreed: “Personally, I would benefit, since I 
would never play it. The overall effect of gambling, however, is in the direction of 
evil, and the State should certainly not promote it.”24
 
 Even as they opposed the 
lottery, these opponents implicitly acknowledged what others vehemently denied: 
that a lottery could raise significant sums that could help balance state budgets. 
Thus, it remains clear that the exaggerated expectations put forth by lottery 
supporters in Albany captured the public imagination. Even those opposed to the 
lottery had to reconcile their opposition with the lottery’s celebrated potential as 
a revenue producer.  
Unsurprisingly given the high expectations, New York Lottery sales disappointed 
proponents once they began in 1967. Despite projections of hundreds of millions 
of dollars in revenue, the lottery sent $52,098,171 to the state’s education fund 
over its first 20 months of operation. “While this is not an inconsiderable sum,” a 
lottery official wrote to Rockefeller, “it is short of what we had hoped for, even 
under the limited circumstance in which we operate.”25 These “limited 
circumstances” represented New York’s attempt to make its lottery a respectable 
operation. Players were required to write their names and addresses to complete 
their ticket purchase and tickets themselves were $1, much more expensive than 
illegal numbers slips. Like the New Hampshire Lottery before it, New York 
offered infrequent drawing which relied on a complicated system of multiple 
raffles and horse races to maintain the lottery’s nobility, avoid federal taxation, 
and ensure the sweepstakes could not be rigged. Yet, after the New Jersey Lottery 
found unprecedented success with cheaper tickets and more frequent drawings in 
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1971, New York revised its lottery operations. Though Rockefeller and his staff 
had assisted the New Jersey state government in its creation of its lottery, they 
quickly recognized the need to compete not only with illegal gambling operations, 
but other state enterprises as well. Using New Jersey as a model, New York 
revised its lottery system in the early 1970s, moving towards cheaper tickets and 
away from drawings based on horse races.26
 
 
In sum, the history of the New York State Lottery reveals a great deal about 
taxation as well as gambling policy in the 1960s. In particular, the lottery 
represents a heretofore overlooked locus on tax anger. When it failed to meet its 
hyperbolic expectations—which were shared by proponents and opponents 
alike—it drove many New Yorkers to further distrust the state-level taxes that 
would become highly contentious during the tax revolt of the 1970s. Winifred 
McIntyre of Wingdale, New York wrote to Rockefeller in 1969: “I am writing you 
to ask you if you are trying to send us all to the poor house, as we will lose our 
homes if this school tax keeps up. I thought the lottery was to keep the schools 
[sic], what is being doing with this money.”27
 
 Rather than illustrate the 
inadequacies of gambling as a means of raising state revenue, the failure of the 
lottery to fully fund the New York state government led to a distrust towards all 
forms of taxation.  
While I am still processing the huge number of documents I examined while at 
the Rockefeller Archive Center, the letters from New Yorkers to Governor 
Rockefeller reveal a great deal about the dynamics of lottery legalization. Their 
letters, as well as the curious fate of the New York State Lottery—which was shut 
down for a year after Rockefeller left office—will sit at the heart of my 
investigation of lotteries in the context of the tumultuous economic climate of the 
late twentieth century.  
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